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REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES.

P. Cornelii Taciti Dialogus de Oratoribus, edited with Prolegomena, Critical Apparatus, Exegetical and Critical Notes, Bibliography and Indexes, by ALFRED GUDEMAN. Boston, Ginn & Co., 1894. Pp. cxxxviii + 447.

It never rains but it pours, in philology it would seem as well as in proverb! After years of lament that the Dialogus has not been accessible to our students except in German editions, with the result, of course, that by the great majority the work has been practically unread and unappreciated, of a sudden we are overwhelmed with a wealth of material for its study scarcely afforded to any other work of Tacitus, or indeed to any other literary monument of antiquity. Peterson's edition, summarizing with much soberness of judgment the most important results of German studies, was followed in less than a year by the book which engages our attention here, while almost simultaneously the work was made accessible for college instruction in the concise and admirable edition of Bennett. It was high time that something should be done to rescue from neglect in England and America this lovely child of Roman genius, which seems to have suffered in attention and regard from the wholly unwarrantable suspicion which rested for so long upon its parentage. It is hardly conceivable now, and it will be still less so when these new editions have brought the work to the appreciation which it deserves, that only a few years ago Messrs. Church and Brodribb should feel called on to make a quasi-apology for associating the Dialogus with the Germania and Agricola in their translation of the minor works, assuring their readers "that it has a certain amount of interest, as it touches on the Roman education of the period," and that it is, moreover, "thoroughly worth reading." However, all that is a thing of the past, and with the thorough and inviting guidance which is now afforded, the Dialogus will gain new friends and cause old ones to think still better of it.

Of the editions named, Professor Gudeman's is by far the most ambitious and complete. He has made a more exhaustive use of the labors of his predecessors, and has contributed more from his own resources. The editor has evidently striven to satisfy every reasonable demand that can be made of an edition of an ancient literary work, and has neglected neither the questions of a more general introductory nature, which naturally confront the reader or which (like the question of authorship) have grown up about the work as critical accretions, nor the more specific requirements of the *recensio*, *emendatio* and *interpretatio*. In all of these sections of the book there is much that is new and stimulating: some old problems have been solved, others have been advanced toward a solution, if not actually disposed of, while not a few entirely new points of view have been disclosed and contribute to a deeper understanding of the work. In so large a mass of matter and where so

decisive a stand is taken toward almost every question involved, criticism will inevitably be provoked. Indeed, I fear that the editor's manner of presentation is sometimes calculated to awaken a feeling of opposition in his readers, and I suspect that occasionally he has defeated his own purpose or the interests of a good argument by himself assuming too vigorously the character of an advocate and by summoning evidence for cumulative effect which were better let alone.

The first sixty-three pages of the Prolegomena are devoted to the question of authorship. Some will doubtless criticise as needless such fullness of treatment of a subject which has been looked upon for the past fifty years as practically settled in favor of Tacitus; and yet the question of date, about which the controversy has more recently raged, is so inextricably interwoven with the whole matter, and the stylistic argument has been placed on so new and different a foundation by the *Lexicon Taciteum*, that it is easy to comprehend the difficulty of combining brevity with thoroughness. There is much here that tempts the reviewer's pen, both to praise and to criticise. But to confine myself to more important points, and especially those where the editor has presented new views, it is interesting to observe his treatment of the point which was formerly believed (and is still by Teuffel-Schwabe, Schanz, Blass and others) to be the decisive evidence of Tacitean authorship—I mean the supposed reference to the *Dialogus* by Pliny in the words *itaque poemata quiescunt* (*crescunt* Mommsen) *quae tu inter nemora et lucos commodissime perfici putas* (IX 10; cf. *Dial.* 9, 29 and 12, 1). Now, the genuineness of the *Dialogus* is defended with a spirit and vigor almost incredible in the case of a question which has practically ceased to be discussed, and one might therefore have imagined that this argument would have been made to yield all there is in it. Not so, however. The editor's impartiality here becomes belligerent, and so far from granting to it decisive force, he holds that the inference commonly drawn from the parallelism is 'wholly fallacious and to be rejected peremptorily.' I do not think, however, that many will agree with most of the reasons adduced (p. xviii, note) for denying any significance to Lange's observation. The second of them, viz. the fact that the thought is a literary commonplace which Tacitus may have given utterance to in other places and at other times, is the important one, and the only consideration of any weight that has been advanced for denying to this parallelism the character of a literary allusion. We must say, therefore, that there is no reason why Pliny may not have had the *Dialogus* in mind in the words above quoted, but that they must be referred to it no one will now maintain, nor, on the other hand, should it be argued that they cannot refer to it. Clearly this is a place where certainty on either side is unattainable. As often Gudeman goes further than is wise in the interest of his argument, when he says that 'the identical collocation *nemora ac lucos*' is found in other Tacitean passages (*Germania* 9, 10 (not 11), 45). Suppose the author of the *Dialogus* had said that poets are fond of cheese and beer, and Pliny had repeated this statement, attributing it to Tacitus—should we believe any the less that he had reference to the words of the *Dialogus* because perhaps in the *Germania* cheese and beer were found in a familiar Teutonic collocation?

Evidently the *pièce de résistance* of this chapter of the Prolegomena is the endeavor to fix finally and within narrow limits the date of the Dialogue's publication. The discussion is opened by a consideration of the time when the conversation reported in the treatise was held, and, by an original and convincing interpretation of the words *centum et viginti anni ab interitu Ciceronis in hunc diem colliguntur* (ch. 17; more fully developed in the note ad loc.), the soundness of the text is vindicated and the date is shown to be fixed entirely by the words *sextam huius principatus stationem* (74/75). Starting, then, with the position laid down by Steiner, that the Dialogue, if Tacitean, must have been written before Domitian's reign, he refutes with much vigor, and successfully too, the objections derived from the phrase *iuvenis admodum* to assigning the publication to a period within six or seven years of the dramatic date. But his refutation, as he says, "only justifies the inference that the Dialogue *may* have been written in the reign of Titus. Happily, it can also be proved (1) that it *must* have been composed at that time and (2) that a later date, while quite incompatible with Tacitean authorship, is at the same time irreconcilable with the authorship of any one else" (p. xxx). The first of these points is the vital one, and yet, in spite of the very positive manner of its statement, I have been unable to discover that any evidence is produced which would restrict the date of publication to the years 79-81. His arguments are as follows: 1) The dramatic setting requires that not too great a time shall have elapsed between the conversation and publication. 2) The Dialogue, if written after Domitian, would involve a literary anachronism, since the subject with which it deals was no longer a theme of discussion in the time of Nerva and Trajan. This is a new point of view, developed with much ingenuity by the editor, and as a fact it is very noteworthy. But as a means of determining a date within the limits of a little more than a decade, it would seem to me of very doubtful value. For, as all the parallel instances adduced by Gudeman show, such literary discussions are never cut off with a square end, and there would be little difficulty in believing that straggling contributions were made for a considerable time to a subject which Quintilian had treated (in his *de causis corruptae eloquentiae*) toward the end of the eighties. But for both of these arguments it is only claimed that they show publication after Domitian's reign to be impossible. The reign of Domitian itself is treated in a peculiar manner. The editor has already given his approval to the sharp alternative formulated by Steiner, that Tacitus must have written the Dialogue before Domitian or he did not write it at all, and, so far as I have been able to ascertain, this is the only rejoinder made to the suggestion of assuming some date within the reign of Domitian. Of course, no one would think of assuming a date in the latter half or even two-thirds of that tyrant's reign, but really the first five years of it demanded some consideration in a discussion which aims to be exhaustive and to fix a definite limit on each side. I say that Steiner's alternative seems to be the only rejoinder to this suggestion, for what the editor has said on p. xxxii on this point he surely did not mean as a serious argument. "This hypothesis," he says, referring to the assumption of a date as late as 85, "is so clearly a mere subterfuge resorted to for the purpose of escaping the alleged difficulties found in the use of *iuvenis admodum* that we dismiss it without further comment, especially as Vibius

Crispus had by that time been doubtless restored to imperial favor, if not to his former power." Obviously, the reasons for rejecting this date are not given by calling the assumption of it a subterfuge, and the remaining force of the argument depends on the value we attach to the word 'doubtless.' So far, then, as the editor helps us we must fall back on Steiner's alternative. Gudeman does not, I believe, tell us why Steiner excludes so rigorously the reign of Domitian, but students familiar with their Tacitus will suspect, even if they do not know Steiner's treatise, that it is on the basis of the well-known words at the beginning of the *Agricola*, *per XV annos . . . per silentium venimus*. And such, in fact, is the case: "also unter Domitian hat Tacitus den Dialog nicht herausgegeben und auch nicht geschrieben, wie er ja unter Domitian überhaupt nichts geschrieben hat" (p. 17). This was the only ground on which Steiner denied that the *Dialogus* could have been written between the years 81 and 96, and Gudeman has advanced no other. I think it will be with some surprise, therefore, that the reader learns in a note to the next chapter of the *Prolegomena* (p. xxxvi⁴³) that the editor does not believe that the inference which Steiner and others have drawn from this passage of the *Agricola* is sound, and that "it does not necessarily exclude a rhetorical treatise like the *Dialogus*, any more than some of Tacitus' speeches which were certainly published in the reign of Domitian, as we must infer from Pliny's letters." Now let us see where we stand concerning the date of publication. The genetic development of the style of Tacitus, as well as the other arguments adduced by Gudeman, we will grant, make publication after Domitian impossible. We will also grant that it could not have been written in the darker days of Domitian's reign. But what have we left to show that it might not have been published in the first lustrum of his principate, accepting, as we must, the editor's interpretation of the passage from the proemium of the *Agricola*? I can find nothing, for we have voluntarily sacrificed the evidence which would restrict us to the years 79-81 by a juster interpretation of *per silentium*. Now, I do not wish to be misunderstood as an advocate of the later date (84-85) assumed by Wolf, Peterson and others. The point that I would make is, not that the early part of the reign of Domitian possesses any more probability than the reign of Titus (for I believe that the editor has dispelled all doubt which the words *iuvenis admodum* might cause), but that so sharply defined a limit as is here attempted cannot be fixed, and that we must content ourselves with saying that the *Dialogus* was written under Titus or in the earlier part of Domitian's reign.

Probably the most successful and striking portion of the editor's argument for the genuineness of the treatise is the section headed 'The Stylistic Character of the *Dialogus*.' Here, making thorough use of the studies of his predecessors and adding much new matter from his own observations, he shows in most admirable and thorough manner the points of identity between the style of the *Dialogus* and the later works, and how the elements of radical difference (the growth of which can still be seen in not a few instances) are all capable of an entirely reasonable and satisfactory explanation by the psychological change through which the author had passed and by the difference in subject-matter between this, his earliest work, and his later productions. After showing so clearly that there is no good reason for denying the author-

ship of Tacitus, it would seem almost useless to refute the claims of Quintilian and Pliny. And yet, for completeness' sake, and because these ancient spectres have even of late years dared to stalk abroad, it will not perhaps seem a work of superfluous zeal to have finally laid them. It is devoutly to be hoped that in these pages we have at length the concluding chapter of a controversy, the survival of which well into the nineteenth century is emphatically an anachronism. We can pardon the suspicions of a Rhenanus and the doubts of a Lipsius, for they were but children of their generation and could not take an historical point of view. In their time, and long after too, conjectures to Cicero might be supported by parallels from Plautus or St. Jerome, and Vigerus could teach the idioms of the Greek language by examples chosen indiscriminately from Demosthenes and St. Chrysostom. But it is unpleasant and not to the credit of our studies to reflect that down to the present century quite universally, and for fifty years longer only to a less extent, the authenticity of a perfectly well-attested work of antiquity was denied on grounds that have most affinity with the oracular judgments of the higher criticism of antiquity—*hic versus Plauti non est, hic est*.

The second chapter of the Prolegomena deals with the dramatic structure of the Dialogus and the interlocutors. It is opened with a brief summary of the contents of the work and then passes to a discussion of its real purpose. This question, if it deserves the rank of such a designation and is not rather a hothouse product of German *Stubenhockerei*, arises from the fact that the discussion does not at once proceed to the question of the decline of oratory, but is preluded by a passage at arms on the relative merits of poetry and oratory. The view of Gilbert, that the real purpose of the work is a defence of poetry, is dismissed very properly, not without much graphic amazement of exclamation points and question marks. But the editor's own explanation of the relevancy of this introductory episode seems to me, in spite of its ingenuity and suggestiveness, to read more into the setting than is really there. The interlocutors are then treated with admirable fullness and completeness.

Perhaps the most important point in this part of the Prolegomena is the endeavor to demonstrate that Secundus is the speaker of chs. 36-40, 8, and that hence a lacuna must be assumed before the words *non de otiosa, etc.* The argument is pressed with great vigor, but not without some sophistries, nor does it seem to me convincing. In the first place, it should be remembered that the burden of proof rests with those who assume the lacuna, and that the attitude of criticism must be sceptical until a conclusive demonstration is made. That the MSS do not give any indication of lacuna here is not of course an insurmountable obstacle to its assumption, as is very well shown, though I think it will generally be felt that the MSS of the Dialogus have given us better ground than is commonly the case for trust in their faithful reproduction of the archetype, by the care with which they have noted the lacuna in ch. 34. But next to MS evidence, which here is lacking, we may ask whether there is any immediate violation of the sequence of thought, the usual ground for the assumption of a lacuna not otherwise indicated. The editor believes that there is, for he characterizes the transition as 'intolerably abrupt and sudden.' Apparently, then, there is room here for a difference of opinion, since, for myself, I cannot really see how a closer connection in

thought could have been desired by the most rigorously logical critic than between the initial sentence of ch. 40 and the one beginning *non de otiosa etc.* (40, 8). The speaker has just referred to the enormous stimulus that was given to eloquence by the *contiones assiduae et datum ius potentissimum quemque vexandi, cum plurimi disertorum . . . ad incessendos principes viros . . . populi, ut histriones, auribus uterentur*. The speaker has already repeatedly remarked, incidentally to his description of the conditions that made ancient eloquence great, that such conditions were not desirable, though they produced great orators,¹ and what could be more natural than for the speaker, reminding his listeners of this thought, to characterize the excessive freedom of speech and of personal attack, which he has just described (in the words quoted) and which was always repugnant to Roman conceptions of personal and civic dignity, in the words that follow: *non de otiosa et quieta re loquimur et quae probitate et modestia gaudeat, set est magna illa . . . eloquentia alumna licentiae, . . . contumax, temeraria, adrogans, quae in bene constitutis civitatibus non oritur*. Indeed, nothing but a consideration of eloquence as a form of Greek *παρρησία* (*datum ius* (= *ἀδεία*) *vexandi*) could have suggested more naturally all of the opprobrious epithets that are attached to it here, and the passage therefore finds a fitting culmination in the admonition that not Sparta nor Crete (*quarum civitatum severissima disciplina et severissimae leges traduntur*), but Athens was the mother of the greatest orators, Athens where *non modo libertas* (sc. *dicendi*), *etiam libido impunita* (Ann. IV 35). I have considered this point somewhat in detail, because it seemed to me, from the standpoint of philological method, the most vital. If, therefore, my argument for the unity of the thought on both sides of the assumed lacuna has carried conviction, it will be seen that neither of the primary conditions for its assumption is present. But the editor lays apparently more stress on the fact that the thought of the words in ch. 40, 8 (*non de otiosa et quieta re*) is here repeated in almost the same words for the third time. But leaving aside the fact that the consideration is a purely subjective one and something which might have appealed differently to an ancient reader and a modern critic, it should be observed, as the editor himself points out, that we have the assurance of the speaker that the idea is one which requires repetition (*ut subinde admoneo* 37, 29). If repetition is ever tolerable and ever occurs without arousing a suspicion of text-corruption, it would seem to furnish least occasion for so doing where it is expressly apologized for and justified by the speaker. Indeed, this thought is most essential to the argument of Maternus, for it required the clearest presentation of the fact that great eloquence *is* an inevitable concomitant of disorder to lead up to his last contention that it is not worth the price. It is to the clear enunciation of this last idea that the sentence in question affords a transition, although it is foreshadowed and intimated from the beginning. Concerning the last and most important argument made by the editor for assigning only the portion from 40, 8 on to Maternus, viz. that it contains sentiments at variance with those expressed in 36-40, 7, I have already implied my criticism. But let us first note briefly the character of these so-called contradictions. The important ones will be found of this

¹ Quis ignorat utilius ac melius esse frui pace quam bello vexari? plures tamen bonos proeliores bella quam pax ferunt, similis eloquentiae condicio (37, 31).

nature: *cum parum esset in senatu breviter censere* (36, 26) and *quid enim opus est longis in senatu sententiis* (41, 14). Now, as I have intimated above, the speaker passes in the sentence before which the lacuna is assumed from a consideration of the *fact* that eloquence is a concomitant of disorder to a *judgment* on that fact (viz. that the price of such eloquence is too great). The same relation holds between the two passages here quoted. The first describes the fact, the second accepts it and admits its influence on oratory, but passes condemnatory judgment upon it. But while practically all the utterances from 40, 9 on are judgments of facts already presented, the part before 40, 8, in which the facts or conditions which produced ancient eloquence are set forth, contains also *judgments* of the same general character as those given more directly and emphatically when the speaker has passed over to criticism. One such example may suffice (omitted by Gudeman from his parallel columns of 'contradictions and repetitions'): *cum tantum orator saperet, quantum erranti populo persuadere poterat* (36, 8). With this compare ch. 40, 20, in which, after observing that Athens, where *omnia populus . . . poterat*, had produced great orators, the speaker continues: *nostra quoque civitas donec erravit etc.* The judgment is uttered incidentally where the aim was to present the actual conditions, and is repeated directly where the speaker has passed from facts to criticism. The number of incidental judgments thus pronounced by the speaker of chs. 36-40, 8 is so large that it is hard to see on what ground Gudeman bases his assertion that the speaker (i. e. of 36-40, 8) "leaves us to infer that he would rejoice in a superior oratorical development at any cost." Finally Gudeman urges that Maternus, having resolved to quit the forum, cannot well have maintained the *indispensability* of eloquence, and cites in evidence of this statement ch. 36, 23: *quin immo sibi ipsi persuaserant* (sc. *antiqui*) *neminem sine eloquentia . . . adsequi posse . . . eminentem locum*, but for what purpose others, I fancy, will wonder, as I do. That Secundus had no share in the debate I do not of course argue. That is a point which only additional and older MS material or ancient allusion, hitherto unobserved, can determine.

Chapter III of the Prolegomena discusses the literary sources of the Dialogus and opens with a proof that the dialogue, "barring a certain historical background, must be regarded as a work of the creative imagination," basing the necessity of such a proof on the statement that the majority of editors and critics have tacitly assumed that the author's explanation of the origin of the treatise, as a faithful reproduction from memory of an actual conversation, is given in good faith. While accepting gratefully the demonstration which follows of the essentially fictitious character of the dialogue, and which illustrates the point with more fullness and detail than I have seen done elsewhere, I cannot but feel that the editor does injustice to the discernment of his predecessors in affirming so strongly that they have failed to recognize the real nature of the dramatic setting. But this is a trifling matter compared with the discussion of the sources of the Dialogus which follows, and which must be reckoned among the most brilliant parts of the book. Here, after calling attention to some of the more striking resemblances to Ciceronian passages which have been noted by others also, the editor presents us with some entirely new and very striking evidence of the author's use of

the Hortensius. This proof is a most ingenious specimen of philological combination, and affords testimony enough to the wideness and thoroughness of the author's reading. The consideration of the Acta of Mucianus, which are mentioned only in the Dialogus, as a possible source is new and interesting, but of course purely conjectural for any part except 37, 8, where reference is made to them. With more confidence Gudeman says of the Epistulae of the same author (ib.) that he "feels convinced that what we learn of the epistolary war waged between the adherents of the Attic school and Cicero, is directly based upon this identical compilation." As a surmise or conjecture, affording a definite starting-point from which investigation might proceed, that is very good, but to be convinced (though I fancy I am taking the author's words too seriously) on the basis of the possibility here advanced would reflect, I fear, on the character of philological proof. Very different from this is the admirable and brilliant demonstration which follows, that many of the ideas on education expressed by Quintilian and Tacitus (in the Dialogus) are ultimately traceable to the famous work of Chrysippus, *περὶ παιδων ἀγωγῆς*.

The fourth chapter of the Prolegomena deals with the 'Style and Language' of the Dialogus. The matter is presented in a very convenient tabular form, with well-nigh exhaustive fullness of illustration. Its value is greatly heightened by references to the more detailed discussion of certain usages in the notes. I believe it may fairly claim to be the first adequate treatment of the subject that has been presented, and it is hard to see how it will ever be superseded.

The fifth and concluding chapter is devoted to the MSS, and contains, besides a description of each of the important codices, a full discussion of the questions of interrelationship and classification, chiefly following Scheuer. With the latter's conclusion concerning the superiority of the Y class Gudeman agrees, and by the correction of some of Scheuer's errors he is able to give to this result a more conclusive character. In this connection may be mentioned the interesting confirmation of the correctness of this view, derived from a consideration of Tacitean usage, in two passages (22, 4 and 22, 8) where the X and Y classes are at variance concerning the position of *eiusdem* and *iam*.

The text is beautifully printed in widely leaded lines and is accompanied by very convenient marginal summaries. The editor has adopted the rule that every deviation from MS authority shall be indicated by italics, but the method chosen has not been carried out consistently, so that one is often at a loss to know, without consulting the *apparatus criticus*, the extent and nature of the change. When one reads *excepi* (accepī MSS) or *oratoris* (oratoris MSS) it is of course clear that a slight variation from the MS tradition is indicated; but why should this simple and convenient device have been abandoned in such cases as *famam* (40 ext., formam MSS), where *famam* would have made it clear, without reference to the ap. crit., that the word was neither an addition of the editor nor an emendation for a word of totally different graphic value? The same thing is true in a good many other instances, e. g. 33, 24 *paratiorem* (parate MSS) instead of *paratiorem* (but 8, 10 correctly *minores*, minus MSS). In 41, 9 *enim* is carelessly printed, instead of *enim*, as if a reading based on MS evidence. It is to be regretted that the editor chose no

means of making clear at a glance the difference between words which are due to the emendation of MS readings and editorial additions or supplements. Why should not the customary pointed brackets <> have been employed? Probably no feature of the book will render it so indispensable an aid to students as the very full and clear apparatus criticus, in which, in addition to the variants of the MSS and the record of conjectural readings adopted, the editor has given, with almost unnecessary fullness, the principal conjectures to the text, especially of recent scholars. I have observed but few omissions of any consequence. In 30, 7 *statim dicturus* is given as Gronov's conjecture, instead of *dicturus* simply, as if *statim* were not afforded by the MSS.

The constitution of the text itself challenges especial attention from the fact that the edition is dedicated to Vahlen, perhaps the leading living Latinist in the realm of pure textual criticism, by a pupil of that distinguished master of the *ars critica*. The independence and originality of the editor in this regard are in striking contrast to the reserve and self-distrust which has hitherto characterized the work of our foremost American scholars in this field. The editor has been trained in the best school of textual criticism, and his book is full of excellent precepts on method and sharp rebuffs of the *libido coniciendi* which has harassed the innocent Dialogus to an uncommon degree. But, alas for good intentions, I can but fear that it will be the general verdict of criticism that he himself must be included in the goodly company of sinners against sound texts. Gudeman has contributed above thirty conjectures (emendations from his point of view¹) to the text of the Dialogus, a considerable number of which had already been made public and discussed in this Journal. Of this number the following seem to me to deserve the title of emendations: 5, 28 *sive . . . vel . . . sive*; 6, ext. *quae diu . . . grata, gratiora* (an improvement on Nissen's similar suggestion, in which the observation that *alia* is a dittography of *diu* deserves special notice); 11, 16 *tuetur* (*tueor* MSS); 13, ext. (involving only the bracketing of *enim* and *-que*, and based on a correct interpretation of *quandoque*); 32, 15 *ius* <*suae*> *civilatis* (supported by Cic. de or. I 40, 184—which is, by the way, cited in a misleading manner); 38, 5 *modum* <*in*> *dicendo* (based on the fact that Andresen's re-collation of A does away with the variant *dicendi*). Not quite so certain, but attractive and probable, is the reading adopted in 7, 13 *apud iuvenes vacuos et adulescentes*. One or two suggestions are rather colorless, obviating some difficulties, but not carrying conviction of their correctness. E. g. 8, 3 *non min* <*ores*> (anticipated by Haase).

Over against this credit side, however, is to be placed a much longer list of changes, in good part more important than those just mentioned, where it is my own conviction that the editor has inflicted positive corruptions on the text of Tacitus, or by the assumption of interpolation has deprived him of his due. It would be obviously out of the question for me to review the score

¹Is it customary or right to make no distinction between the words *emendation* and *conjecture*? I do not of course refer to the fact that G. designates his own conjectures as emendations (that is his duty if he has convinced himself that he has restored the author's words), but to such expressions as these, where the MS reading is defended: p. 133 (10, 18), "it is needless to discuss the *emendation* of Ribbeck"; p. 266 (26, 10), "debeat is the reading of our MSS, which we have no right to *emend*, unless," etc.; p. 276 (28, 5), "the many *emendations* of the MS reading," etc.; and elsewhere frequently.

and more of conjectures that belong to this category. Some of the most important, however, I shall select for comment.

7, 10 *tum habere quod si non in ALVO oritur, nec codicillis datur nec cum gratia venit.*] in *alio* MSS. G. enumerates thirteen conjectures here and is himself the author of the reading in the text, which Pithoeus also had arrived at before him. All editors seem to agree that the MS reading is untenable, and they have conspired to prevent Tacitus from saying what he meant. A defence of the MS reading will be a sufficient refutation of this conjecture as well as others. A writer on Christian apologetics says: "If a defence of our belief rest not on other foundation (i. e. *nisi in alio oritur*) it cannot gain support from miracles and wonders," and we understand him well enough, nor do we require to be told that he refers to the deeper spiritual things of the faith. And so here, when Tacitus says, "Then I seemed to possess that which if it take not its rise in another source (*nisi in alio oritur*), is not given by letters patent nor comes with favor," why should we not understand just as clearly that reference is made to natural endowment or talent? The Latinity of *in alio* is quite unexceptionable, nor does the usage *in alio* = *in* (or *ex*) *alia re* call for any comment or defence in Tacitus. This same indefiniteness of statement where no obscurity arises we find in 8, 24 in the same connection: *Vespasianus . . . intellegit . . . Marcellum et Crispum attulisse ad amicitiam suam quod non a principe acceperint nec accipi possit.*

10, 20 <mox> *summa adeptus*] *summa adeptus* MSS. Gudeman rejects Vahlen's defence of the MS tradition because *adeptus* never has the meaning of *praeditus aliqua re* in Tacitus. This is certainly no good reason for deserting a reading in harmony with Ciceronian usage, when *all other* examples of *adipisci* are from the later works. In our author, whose style confessedly suffered a radical transformation, we should least of all attempt to restore consistency of usage between works separated by a dozen years and more. This is a complaint one has to make repeatedly.

18, 6 *antiquos . . . quos utinam nulla parte MIRATUS esset Calvus aut Caelius aut . . . Cicero*] *imitatus* MSS, which seems to G. absurd and impossible. The conjecture is defended at length in this Journal, vol. XII, pp. 339-42. That *imitatus* is tolerable for Caelius G. admits (cf. 21, 17). That Aper could have easily applied it to Cicero is shown by 22, 10: *priores eius orationes non carent vitiis antiquitatis*. But "when we come to Calvus the *imitatus* of our text is simply ludicrous" (A. J. P., l. c.), says G., and cites Cicero's judgment of the over-refined style of Calvus. But we have to do here not with Cicero, but with Aper, who, as G. reminds us (ad 21, 33), "does not shrink from exaggeration and misrepresentation, if it suits his purpose." That he did not share Cicero's, and indeed the prevalent, estimate of Calvus we may learn from 21, 13 *quo minus sublimius et cultius diceret . . . ingenium et vires defuisse*. *Imitatus* is therefore entirely appropriate in the mouth of Aper, however it might be in fact. On the other hand, *miratus* would be distinctly out of place here, for it is not clear why Aper should wish so ardently that they had not *admired* the ancients if, as G. maintains, he could not affirm that this admiration had had any effect on their style.

20, 7 (*index*), *nisi . . . nitore et cultu descriptionum VITIATUS et corruptus est, aversatur*] *invitatus* MSS. This conjecture seems to me so obviously to 'vitate

and corrupt' the text of Tacitus that I should not discuss it, had it not been adopted by Bennett. The general considerations advanced against *invitatus* are trivial, and seem to depend on an exaggerated interpretation of the turpitude implied in *corruptus*. To say that a judge is *bribed* is doubtless very bad, but when you have already said *nitore et cultu descriptionum*, you have taken away the suggestion of baseness beforehand. And what allurements could be more harmless than charm of eloquence by which the judge is made to listen to a long speech, against his will and intention? The second difficulty concerning the use of *invitare* only of 'harmless allurements' does not therefore exist.¹ Concerning the stylistic principle which G. claims is here violated for the only time in the Dialogus by the use of *et* to connect two verbs standing in some causal relation to each other (instead of *ac*); cf. 9, 7 *defensus et tibi obligatus*; 17, 20 *arcere litoribus et pellere aggressi sunt* ('attempted to keep from landing and (that failing) to drive out'); and perhaps also 39, 23 *excitare et incendere*. Finally, what possible significance can there be in the fact that Cicero, in an entirely different connection (viz. election bribery), has used these two words in juxtaposition? We have had occasion already to complain of the abuse of this form of argument, which only has significance, as a rule, in defence of uncertain Latinity.

36, 2 *eloquentia, sicut flamma, . . . motibus excitatur et urendo CALESCIT*] (anticipated by Maehly) *clarescit* MSS. The climax of the simile is rudely destroyed, G. believes, by the reading *clarescit*, which is an 'otiose repetition' of *motibus excitatur*. Accepting the editor's standpoint, let us observe the use of *excitare*. The word is almost a terminus technicus of an early stage in the production of fire, and hence is naturally antecedent to *urendo clarescit*. This usage G. admits in his critical note ad loc. ("the brightness of the fire is the immediate effect of *motibus excitatur*"), but he still holds to his view (A. J. P. XII, p. 346) that *clarescit* is an otiose repetition and hence false. But is it not a rather loose use of language to characterize the statement of an effect from a cause as a repetition? Or again, why is light (*clarescit*) as an effect of *motibus excitatur* more of a repetition than heat (*calescit*)? But defending the MS reading positively, we may observe that the author does not lose sight of the figure in *clarescit* in the rest of his speech, e. g. 37, 21 *crescit cum amplitudine rerum vis ingenii, nec quisquam claram et illustrem orationem efficere potest nisi qui causam parem invenit*.

Finally, one or two instances where the suggestion of text-corruption has come from a 'transposition variant.'

6, 8 *plerumque venire*] following Codex D. This order is accepted against all the other MSS because "*plerumque* in a non-superlative sense is with two exceptions out of 22 exx. always prepositive." If we inquire into the nature of D we learn from Gudeman, in the article to which he refers us ad loc., that "this codex abounds in transpositions so that it is difficult to determine whether they were brought about by accident or not." I fancy that most of us will think that this sort of business is to saw off the limb on which we are sitting, and will prefer to make the ratio of *plerumque*'s position 19:3 instead of 20:2.

¹Though nothing to the point, G.'s observation that *invitare* is used exclusively of such harmless allurements is unreasonable and incorrect, as Ovid, Her. 16 (17), 183 shows, *invitant omnia culpam* (cited by Lewis and Short).

19, 4 *Cassium Severum . . . quem primum adfirmant flexisse ab ista vetere [atque directa] dicendi via*. But does *directa* admit of no satisfactory explanation? Interpretation must start from a consideration of the character of Severus' oratory, of which Tacitus says in 26, 18 *primus contempto ordine rerum, omissa modestia et pudore verborum etc.* Cf. also Seneca, Epp. 100, 5 (on Fabianus) *nihil invenies sordidum: electa verba sunt, non captata nec huius saeculi more contra naturam suam posita et inversa*. Most of Gudeman's criticism of *directa* is beside the mark, for Aper's complaint has to do chiefly with the length and tediousness of the older orations and their simplicity (*directa via*), amounting to dullness.

34, 21 *auditorium semper plenum [semper novum]*. *Novum* is bracketed as being an epithet equally applicable to the audiences of the speaker's own day, and not peculiar to those of the republic. But wholly without ground, for (1) the origin of the gloss is not apparent (nor does Gudeman suggest an explanation of it), nor (2) is the word superfluous. It would scarcely seem necessary to call attention to the fact that the distinction here made is between the audience of a school-room (*in condiscipulis nihil profectus cum pueri inter pueros et adolescentuli inter adulescentulos pari securitate et dicant et audiantur* 35, 9) and that of the *iudicia et contiones* (34, 5), before which the young orator of the republic got his training. To call the latter *new* in distinction from the former is to emphasize a significant difference.

Finally, in the acceptance of conjectures of other scholars, the editor seems to me to have been too free, and I have noted more than a dozen instances where their conjectures have displaced perfectly satisfactory MS readings. Some of the more important instances are 14, 12 *ardentior* (*audentior* MSS; cf. *Lexicon Quintilianum*, s. voc.); 25, 18 *Asinius nervosior* (*numerosior* MSS; cf. Quint. 9, 4, 76, and Schmalz, *D. Sprachgebrauch des Asin. Pol.*, p. 5 ff.); 28, 16 *aut eligeatur* (*eligebatur autem* MSS, which is required by context, as ch. 29 init. shows; i. e. mother *and* relative on the one hand, compared with the hired nurse *and* worthless slave on the other).

The largest portion of the book is taken up by the critical and exegetical commentary, the critical portion of which has already been discussed. It would, however, be very unjust to leave the reader to draw an inference concerning the exegetical part (which is much the larger) from the judgment which has been pronounced on the critical notes. Indeed, there is no relation between them in point of merit, and whatever others may think of the constitution of the text and its justification, I venture to affirm that there will be little divergence of opinion concerning the value of the exegetical commentary. Perhaps its most characteristic feature is the fact that it carries out consistently and methodically the principle of interpreting Tacitus from himself in regard to thought as well as language. In the latter respect greatest completeness has been attained—a completeness which, of course, would hardly have been possible without the *Lexicon Taciteum*. But, as in relation to the later works of Tacitus, so in relation to the whole history of the Latin language, the material for comparison of usage in regard to vocabulary, semasiology, syntax and style has been amassed with a fullness which excites admiration and amazement. It is from this point of view that the

work will doubtless appeal most strongly to present tendencies in American scholarship and receive from it a warm welcome. But while this is perhaps the most conspicuous phase of the commentary, I have not observed that any side of a just interpretation has been neglected. That the most important illustrative passages have been printed in full, all users of the book will be grateful, and they will admire, too, the diligence and judgment with which new material has been summoned. It would require a much longer familiarity with the commentary than I now possess, in spite of diligent and interested study, to point out exactly the number of new interpretations of the text itself, of observations of linguistic usage, or of original contributions to the most varied phases of classical study that are contained in these pages, but it must be very considerable. But I have already far transcended the limits of space allotted me, and I must forbear to touch on the countless points which here invite attention. One matter, however, of more general interest I may perhaps be pardoned for alluding to. On p. 58 Gudeman says that the dread of repeating the same word "is a modern stylistic sentimentality, quite foreign to the ancients." This view I have heard expressed repeatedly, and perhaps it is true, but I venture at least to challenge it. The editor, in support of his view, refers to Quintilian, X 1, 7 (not 17, of course), but Quintilian in this passage (discussing the means of acquiring *copia rerum et verborum*) does not by any means imply that it is unnecessary to avoid such repetition, but condemns as puerile and useless the mechanical method of attaining that end by committing synonyms to memory. *Nobis autem*, he continues, *copia cum iudicio paranda est*. The authorities, furthermore, to whom Gudeman refers, so far as accessible to me, do not share his view. To these we may add Volkmann (p. 577), who observes that such repetition is avoided except where a special rhetorical figure is designed (to which class several of Gudeman's examples belong), and Schmalz (Stilistik, p. 579), who notes that the repetition without special motive is an evidence of carelessness, and that, on the other hand, Silver Latinity in particular performed almost incredible feats of variation in the expression of the same thought. My own observation is based on no collections of material nor detailed examination of the point in question, but it had led me to the belief that the avoidance of repetition of the same word is an element of ancient style certainly as early as Plato, and in Latin from Cicero, inclusive, on.¹ That examples to the contrary might be cited in considerable number I do not doubt, but whether they would prove any more than a similar collection (which could easily be made) from English writers seems to me questionable. That repetitions in the interest of clearness (or from carelessness) occur in almost all writers is obvious, and this fact, but with a perfectly clear implication of habitual avoidance, Quintilian recognizes when he says (IX 1, 24): *neque verebor explicandae rei gratia frequentiore eiusdem nominis repetitionem*.

¹The *ποικιλία*, which is so striking a characteristic of all our literature and which is nowhere more boldly championed than by Dr. Miles Smith in the Preface to the Authorized Version, seems to be distinctly due to Cicero, and Cicero, in his turn, was much under the fascination of Plato, who, to be frank, abuses *ποικιλία* so much as to make it impossible at times to take him as seriously as a philosopher ought to be taken. Isokrates, whose pretensions to 'philosophy' Plato heartily despises, is very exact in the use of words, and Quintilian (10, 1, 13) is careful to warn the beginner against change for the sake of change.—B. L. G.

The work is concluded by a very valuable and complete bibliography, a complete *index locorum* and an *index rerum et verborum*, not quite so complete as the fullness of the commentary would seem to demand.

Where so much is given it would seem ungrateful to complain of the omission of anything, and probably what I have in mind does not properly fall within the sphere of an edition. But where such fullness has been aimed at and attained, it might not seem unfair to have expected in the Prolegomena some discussion of the *Dialogus* as a literary work and of its place in the history of Roman literature. For while the student who has read widely will doubtless know it, to the more casual reader it would have been a service to point out the unique position of the *Dialogus* as a work of literary criticism: to have called attention to the fact that, in spite of imitation of Ciceronian phraseology and dramatic motives, it is an original work of first magnitude—indeed, the most original specimen of literary criticism that Latin antiquity has handed down to us. For where else in ancient literary judgments shall we find what we call the historical point of view—the realization that literature is a part of life and dependent upon social and political conditions and changes? This thought has become so commonplace with us that we are in danger of failing to distinguish between the clearness of historical vision which characterizes the criticisms of Tacitus (especially from ch. 36 on—Maternus) and the technical standpoint of Quintilian. Quintilian, we can imagine, would have guaranteed to restore the eloquence of the republic, if he could but reform the false teaching of his day, but Tacitus knew better than that. Not that Tacitus was uninfluenced by Quintilian, for somehow, whether directly or indirectly, he was familiar with his teachings, but he transfused the data derived from them with historical insight. Hence the seemingly anomalous circumstance (and so also in relation to Cicero) of producing a work which betrays dependence in detail, but a much larger independence. But it is ungracious to complain of omissions where so much is given, and for this and every other question pertaining to the *Dialogus*, Professor Gudeman's edition furnishes abundant material. It is unfortunate that the nature of things requires us to be briefer in praise than in dissent, but it will, I may trust, be understood that my appreciation of the whole work is not less grateful and hearty because in many places I am unable to share the editor's views. The work is an enduring monument to the scholarship and devotion of the editor, and deserves to be widely circulated.

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The Stanford Dictionary of Anglicised Words and Phrases, edited for the Syndics of the University Press by C. A. M. FENNELL, D. Litt. Cambridge, At the University Press, 1892.

This valuable dictionary should have been noticed sooner, but *vita brevis, longa ars*, and no one has yet discovered the art of compressing into a short life all that one wishes to do. The late Mr. J. F. Stanford left to the University of Cambridge, in 1882, £5000 for the production of a dictionary of "Anglicised Words and Phrases," for which Mr. Stanford had made many notes and collections. He had himself interpreted the term 'Anglicised' to